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CAN THE VICE PRESIDENT PRESIDE AT HIS OWN
IMPEACHMENT TRIAL?: A CRITIQUE OF BARE TEXTUALISM
JOEL K. GOLDSTEIN*
Turn the clock back for a moment to August 1973. In the midst of the
burgeoning Watergate scandal, the nation discovered that Vice President Spiro
T. Agnew was being investigated for allegedly accepting bribes from
contractors, and for committing tax fraud while Governor of Maryland and
Vice President. The investigation, by attorneys in the United States Attorneys
Office in Maryland, ultimately gathered sufficient evidence to present to a
grand jury. To avoid the spectre of likely indictment and prosecution, Agnew
elected to resign his office and plead nolo contendere.1
But suppose Agnew had decided not to go quietly.2 Instead of resigning
and pleading, imagine he decided to go to Congress, to challenge the House to
impeach him and, if it did, the Senate to convict him. Although this possibility
may seem far-fetched now, Agnew did at one point appear headed in that
direction.3 Suppose the House had charged Agnew with committing
impeachable crimes that, if proven, justified his removal. As the House
considered impeaching President Nixon, the Senate would have faced a trial to
determine whether Agnew, the person first in line to succeed Nixon, must be
removed.
As the Senate began its deliberations, with Senate president pro tempore
James Eastland presiding, let us suppose Agnew entered the Senate chamber
and strolled to the front. “I’m here to preside,” Agnew told a startled Eastland.
“Give me the gavel. Get out of my chair.” Agnew’s presence in and of itself,
* Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law. It is a pleasure to join so many
colleagues in contributing this essay to this issue of the Saint Louis University Law Journal in
honor of Professor Eileen Searls. Her commitment to our Law School, her extraordinary
contributions to our Library, and her many kindnesses have enriched our careers and inspired
similar conduct in others.
I am grateful to Patricia Fitzsimmons and John Howard for research assistance and to
Mary Dougherty for retyping this essay. Shortcomings are my responsibility.
1. See RICHARD M. COHEN & JULES WITCOVER, A HEARTBEAT AWAY: THE
INVESTIGATION & RESIGNATION OF VICE PRESIDENT SPIRO T. AGNEW (1974).
2. SPIRO T. AGNEW, GO QUIETLY . . . OR ELSE (1980).
3. This supposition is not far-fetched. In fact, Agnew toyed with the idea of asking the
House for a hearing barely two weeks before he resigned. See COHEN & WITCOVER, supra note
1, at 253-57.
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was something of a surprise. During the twentieth century, the Vice President’s
role as the Senate’s presiding officer had atrophied. Like other Vice
Presidents, Agnew had spent little time discharging the one on-going
responsibility the original Constitution gave them.4 In the twentieth century,
the Vice Presidency had become essentially an executive office.5 Still, the
Constitution provides that the Vice President shall be President of the Senate,6
and Agnew, in this fantasy, was ready to do that duty—insistent on doing it, in
fact.
Now most of us pondering this hypothetical situation would probably be
inclined to react, “No way, José. Agnew can’t preside at his own trial.” Yet if
we went looking to the text of the Constitution to confirm our intuition, our
next reaction might well be “Eastland, we’ve got a problem.”
Professor Michael Stokes Paulsen recently imagined a scenario like this,
examined the text of the Constitution, and, in a clever article, suggested that
the Constitution would permit the Vice President of the United States to
preside over his own impeachment trial.7 “Now that’s stupid,” concluded
Professor Paulsen, in nominating this result for a coveted spot on the list of
“Constitutional Stupidities.”8 Professor Paulsen is not the first prominent
scholar to express this conclusion. In 1983, Professor Stephen L. Carter
concluded “that the Vice President could preside at his own impeachment trial,
should he choose to do so,” a conclusion he described as one of “a few glaring
errors” the founders made.9 Seven years later, he confidently repeated his
claim that “[t]he founders designed a Constitution in which the Vice President
presides at his own impeachment trial” as evidence of the interpretation of the
document.10 Michael Gerhardt, a leading authority on impeachment, endorses
this conclusion,11 as did Richard M. Pious,12 a foremost expert on the
Presidency.

4. See JOEL K. GOLDSTEIN, THE MODERN AMERICAN VICE PRESIDENCY: THE
TRANSFORMATION OF A POLITICAL INSTITUTION 142-44 (1982).
5. See Joel K. Goldstein, The New Constitutional Vice Presidency, 30 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 505, 530, 544-46 (1995).
6. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 4.
7. Michael Stokes Paulsen, Someone Should Have Told Spiro Agnew, 14 CONST.
COMMENTARY 245 (1997).
8. Id. at 246 & n.1.
9. Stephen L. Carter, The Political Aspects of Judicial Power: Some Notes on the
Presidential Immunity Decision, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 1341, 1357 & n.72 (1983).
10. Stephen Carter, The Role of the Courts in Separation of Powers Disputes, 68 WASH. U.
L.Q. 669, 675 (1990).
11. MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT PROCESS: A CONSTITUTIONAL
AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 65 (1996).
12. Richard M. Pious, Impeaching the President: The Intersection of Constitutional and
Popular Law, 43 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 859, 862 n.15 (1999).
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Surely most of us would agree that it would be tres stupide to let Spiro
Agnew, or any Vice President, conduct his own trial. Indeed, we would
probably find that assessment not sufficiently severe. For the nation to face the
trauma of an impeachment trial of a bribe-accepting Vice President as a
prelude to a similar proceeding concerning a justice-obstructing President
would be bad enough. To allow the alleged crook preside over his trial would
test our faith in the wisdom of the founders.
But, before we tag the founders with this blunder, it is worth asking
whether the Constitution does, in fact, so provide. One cannot lightly dismiss
the conclusion of four such eminent scholars, even if it is a judgment on a
question on which they did not set out to build their reputations.13 Is the
Carter-Paulsen-Gerhardt-Pious verdict the most compelling constitutional
conclusion? Would the Constitution really sanction such a procedure, which
they, and we, would agree is asinine?
Now I know what you’re thinking, even those of you who may share my
confidence that the Constitution does not mean what Professor Paulsen et al.
suggests. “Take a deep breath, Joel,” you counsel. “Before you spin out 150
footnotes that 250 million Americans will never read, answer me one question:
Who cares? Who cares whether the Constitution would let the Vice President
run his own trial? Certainly not Carter, who devoted a mere footnote to it
seventeen years ago; not Paulsen, who gave only two pages to the topic in a
forum he occasionally uses to advance witty constitutional interpretations.14
And why should they? Even if they’re right, so what? As a practical matter,
what Vice President would ever have the chutzpah, not to mention bad
judgment, to try to run his own inquest? All it shows, even if Carter et al. are
right, is that the framers were fallible; like the rest of us, they made mistakes.

13. To be sure, the four did not think the topic worthy of a full-length exposition. Professors
Carter, Gerhardt and Pious basically covered it in a footnote; Paulsen was most loquacious,
giving the topic two pages. Several who have reached different conclusions have also managed
to say their piece briefly. See, e.g., John D. Feerick, The Vice-Presidency and the Problems of
Presidential Succession and Inability, 32 FORDHAM L. REV. 457, 462 & n.30 (1964) (noting in
text that “no presiding officer was mentioned for a trial of the Vice President” and in a footnote
observing that “[p]resumably” the Senate President pro tempore would preside); Brian C. Kalt,
Pardon Me?: The Constitutional Case Against Presidential Self-Pardons, 106 YALE L.J. 779,
795-96 & n.101 (1996) (criticizing Vice-President-Presides thesis in one paragraph); Akhil Reed
Amar & Vikram David Amar, Is the Presidential Succession Law Constitutional?, 48 STAN. L.
REV. 113, 122 n.59 (1995) (same).
14. See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, Is Bill Clinton Unconstitutional? The Case for
President Strom Thurmond, 13 CONST. COMMENTARY 217 (1996); Michael Stokes Paulsen, I’m
Even Smarter than Bruce Ackerman: Why the President Can Veto His Own Impeachment, 16
CONST. COMMENTARY 1 (1999). It is possible that Professor Paulsen is kidding here, too. If so,
his satire is more subtle than I can process. In any event, he is not alone in offering this
constitutional interpretation as a valid one but is joined by other thoughtful scholars.
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But who ever could have thought they were perfect? Fortunately, this
“mistake” is one that won’t come home to roost.”
Now I agree with most of this. (After all, I wrote it). Whether Agnew
could have presided is not one of the two or three most urgent topics in
constitutional law. Historical circumstance has never forced us to address the
question, and propriety and common sense make it unlikely that we will. The
republic will not fall if the Vice President-Presides thesis stands unchallenged.
But this thesis does raise another, and a rather basic, issue in American
government—how should one go about interpreting the Constitution? Both
Professors Carter and Paulsen rely exclusively on textual arguments to reach
and defend their conclusion here under discussion.15 But what is the proper
role of textual analysis in searching for constitutional meaning especially
where, as is the case here, the text speaks only indirectly to a subject and the
conclusion it might support, is, as Professor Paulsen aptly put it, “stupid?”
In recent years, textual arguments have made something of a comeback in
constitutional interpretation. Whereas much constitutional argument was
conducted not so long ago with little reference to the text, judicial and
academic discussions now stress textual arguments.16 The Vice PresidentPresides conclusion makes manifest a weakness in certain applications of
textual argument. It provides us with a cautionary tale about the way in which
clever textual arguments, disembodied from other constitutional anchors, can
mislead. Rather than relying solely on the text where, as here, it speaks
indirectly and unclearly, a more appropriate mode of constitutional
interpretation would also consider other types of constitutional argument to
reach a conclusion. Such an approach has been formulated by leading
constitutional theorists.17 It would not support the Vice President-Presides
result.
This essay begins by outlining the similar arguments that Professors Carter
and Paulsen advance which rely exclusively on textual analysis. It then briefly
discusses whether the issue is a political question. After briefly describing
other types of conventional constitutional arguments the authors might have
used to address this topic, the essay shows how these arguments would have
presented a fuller and more satisfactory constitutional conclusion.

15. Professors Gerhardt and Pious simply state the conclusion in passing.
16. See, e.g., U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995); Clinton v. New
York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Merryman Power and the Dilemma of
Autonomous Executive Branch Interpretation, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 81 (1993); Edwin Meese, III,
The Law of the Constitution, 61 TUL. L. REV. 979 (1987); Akhil Reed Amar, Marbury, Section 13
and the Original Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 443 (1989).
17. PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION (1982);
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100
HARV. L. REV. 1189 (1987).
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PROFESSOR PAULSEN’S ANALYSIS

Professor Paulsen points out that the Constitution provides that the Vice
President “shall be President of the Senate.”18 The Senate’s power to make its
rules of proceeding, Professor Paulsen argues, “cannot be used to strip the Vice
President of his specific constitutional prerogative . . . .”19
Since the
Constitution grants the Vice President the power to preside, only some
constitutional exception can limit this grant. To be sure, the Constitution, in
two separate places, mentions instances when the Vice President does not
preside. In the President Pro Tempore Clause,20 Professor Paulsen points out,
the Constitution empowers the Senate to choose “a President pro tempore, in
the Absence of the Vice President, or when he shall exercise the Office of
President of the United States.” But a Vice President under trial is certainly
not exercising the Office of President (let us hope). And, Professor Paulsen
points out, a Vice President attending his Senate trial is not absent from its
chamber.21
The Constitution also provides that when the Senate tries the President on
impeachment, “the Chief Justice shall preside,” not the vice president.22 But
the text does not withdraw the Vice President’s right to preside when he is
tried for impeachment. Thus, Professor Paulsen argues the “Chief Justice shall
preside” clause encourages the inference that the framers did not intend to
disqualify the Vice President from presiding over his own trial. “Applying the
principle of expressio unius, it is clear that if the framers had meant to
disqualify the Vice President in the case of his own impeachment, they would
have said so.”23
Professor Carter’s discussion, though more abbreviated, generally follows
the same lines. His conclusion—the Vice President can preside at his own
impeachment trial—rests on four propositions. 1) The Vice President is
President of the Senate; 2) The Constitution only requires the Vice President
“to turn over the gavel to another individual” when the Senate tries the
President; 3) the Vice President, too, is subject to impeachment and Senate
trial; 4) Since the Constitution does not require the Vice President to relinquish
his chair during his trial he may preside over it.24

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 4.
Paulsen, supra note 7, at 245.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 5.
Paulsen, supra note 7, at 245.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
Paulsen, supra note 7, at 246.
Carter, Political Aspects, supra note 9, at 1357, n.72.
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II. A POLITICAL QUESTION?
Now, it is perhaps tempting to think constitutionalists may be able to avoid
the merits of this issue by resorting to that familiar filter, the case or
controversy requirement. The courts have articulated several factors which
may render an issue nonjusticiable or not fit for adjudication.25 It is quite
possible that a court, if presented with the issue, would regard it as a political
question beyond judicial competence. Indeed, in Nixon v. United States,26 the
Supreme Court held that at least some issues relating to impeachment are
political questions which courts cannot decide on the merits. Judge Walter L.
Nixon, Jr. had challenged a Senate rule which allowed a Senate committee,
instead of the whole body, to listen to and observe witnesses and issue a report
to the Senate pertinent to his impeachment. Judge Nixon complained that this
procedure violated the Impeachment Trial Clause which provides that “[t]he
Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments.”27 What “try” meant
in the Senate impeachment clause was a political question, the Court held.
The Court gave various reasons for its conclusion, but at least four would
seem to preclude judicial review of a decision regarding who would preside
over Agnew’s impeachment. First, based on the historical record, the Court
found no evidence the framers intended judicial review of impeachment.28
Second, the Court deemed questions regarding impeachment nonjusticiable,
because finality was required for presidential impeachment. It simply would
not do to have the nation endure a protracted period in which the courts
adjudicated whether a President had been wrongfully removed from office.
The Court seemed to imply that since the Constitution does not distinguish
between impeachment proceedings for the President and federal judges in this
respect at least, the same concerns which would preclude review of a
presidential impeachment would inhibit judicial review of Judge Nixon’s
trial.29 If that consideration prevented review of an impeachment of a district
court judge it would apply all the more so to impeachment of a Vice President,
especially one only an impeachment-and-conviction-of-Richard-M.-Nixon
away from the Presidency. Moreover, the court feared judicial review of
impeachments would slide it down a slippery slope. Certain remedial
problems could arise. Could a court order a removed federal judge reinstated?
Could it direct Congress to create another judgeship if Judge Nixon’s spot was
filled?30 Finally, the court concluded that it would be inappropriate for the

25. See, e.g., NORMAN REDLICH, JOHN ATTANASIO & JOEL K. GOLDSTEIN,
UNDERSTANDING CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 24-46 (2d ed. 1999).
26. 506 U.S. 224 (1993).
27. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
28. Nixon, 506 U.S. at 233-34.
29. Id. at 236.
30. Id.
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judiciary to review an impeachment conviction since it might later preside over
a criminal prosecution of the same officer.31 In Agnew’s case, that would
hardly have been a hypothetical concern. Indeed, a full scale investigation was
underway and the Department of Justice was prepared to seek an indictment.
Of course, the issue here differs from that in Nixon in two obvious
respects. First, some different parts of the constitutional text are involved. In
Nixon, the Court held that the language giving the Senate “the sole power to try
all Impeachments” did not implicitly require “that the proceedings must be in
the nature of a judicial trial.”32 It reached that conclusion in part because the
Constitution explicitly imposed three requirements on the Senate—that its
members be under oath or affirmation, that the Chief Justice preside over
presidential impeachments, and that a two-thirds vote be required for
conviction;33 the perceived precision of these limits caused the court to
conclude that “the Framers did not intend to impose additional limitations on
the form of the Senate proceedings by the use of the word ‘try’ . . . .”34 On the
other hand, advocates of the Vice President-Presides interpretation might argue
that this situation is different, and accordingly would be justiciable, for two
reasons. A separate clause of the Constitution provides that “[t]he Vice
President of the United States shall be President of the Senate.”35 The effort to
oust Agnew would arguably conflict with that entitlement. Accordingly, this
issue involves a discrete clause which requires judicial interpretation.
Moreover, one of the three limitations—the Chief Justice shall preside when
the President is impeached—arguably implies that when someone else is
impeached no special arrangements are required.
Moreover, some considerations regarding checks and balances, which
influenced the Court in Nixon do not apply so forcefully here. There the Court
concluded that judicial review of judicial impeachments was contrary to the
basic system of checks and balances, since “impeachment was designed to be
the only check on the Judicial Branch by the Legislature.”36 It would not do to
leave the checkee power to review checkers. But here that constraint would
not arise. On the contrary, here the parties disputing the coveted right to
preside presumably would be the Vice President, a member of the Executive
Branch, and the President pro tempore of the Senate. The Court would umpire
this dispute not involving a judicial officer. The system of judicial checks and
balances would not be undermined.

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id. at 234.
Id. at 229.
Nixon, 506 U.S. at 230.
Id.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 4.
Nixon, 506 U.S. at 235.
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The possibility the issue poses a political question offers no easy escape
from this riddle. First, the Court might reject the political question escape, in
which case it would have to address the merits. Moreover, the fact that a court
deems an issue a political question does not mean the Constitution does not
address it. It simply may mean the Constitution speaks in a language judges
cannot or will not interpret. The Constitution speaks to Congressmen as well
as to judges; they, too, are duty bound to act consistently with its directions.
Somebody (other than just law professors) would need to address the
constitutional question and act accordingly. The Vice President-Presides
analysis, therefore, requires consideration on the merits. Accordingly, we are
left with the question of how we should interpret the Constitution in such a
case.
III. MODES OF INTERPRETATION
The conclusion that Professor Paulsen et al. reach rests entirely on textual
analysis. Textual arguments use fragments of the constitutional document to
support conclusions about constitutionality. Although usage admits different
understandings of textual arguments, generally speaking they address “the
present sense of the words” of some provision.37
In recent years, textualism has gained new prominence, and appropriately
so. It is, after all, a constitution being interpreted, and that implies some
measure of fidelity to its text. Clearly, the words of the document are not
irrelevant; far from it. But to acknowledge their relevance is not to treat them
as invariably dispositive.
In fact, constitutional interpretation resorts to a battery of modes of
constitutional arguments,38 only one of which emphasizes the text. Those
engaged in constitutional analysis often invoke three types of historical
argument. They often identify the Constitution’s meaning with the intent of
the founders, the drafters and/or ratifiers of the document. Although
shortcomings of originalism have not remained secret,39 judicial and academic
discussions generally pay some homage to the founders’ intent. A second type
of historical argument, on-going history, though less prominent, also appears in
discussions of constitutional meaning.40 It rests upon the premise that
constitutional meaning can emerge from the repeated practices of
governmental institutions which are accepted and relied on over time.
37. BOBBITT, supra note 17, at 7.
38. See, e.g., BOBBITT, supra note 17; Fallon, supra note 17; MICHAEL J. GERHARDT &
THOMAS D. ROWE, JR., CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: ARGUMENTS AND PERSPECTIVES (1993);
REDLICH, ATTANASIO & GOLDSTEIN, supra note 25, at 2-4.
39. See, e.g., Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.
L. REV. 204 (1980).
40. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316 (1819); Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610-13 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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Precedent constitutes a third type of constitutional argument. Much
constitutional discussion addresses not what the text says but rather the
doctrines judges have crafted during the last two centuries. Terms like “strict
scrutiny,” “over breadth,” or “clear and present danger” are not found in the
text of the Constitution; rather they are part of the gloss judges have placed on
it. Like originalism and on-going history, judicial doctrine really reflects an
historical approach to constitutional analysis. It differs, however, in its focus
on the role of judges in shaping constitutional meaning, an emphasis our
common law experience supports and which Marbury v. Madison41
reinforces.42
Structural arguments represent another common mode of constitutional
interpretation. “Structural arguments are claims that a particular principle or
practical result is implicit in the structures of government and the relationships
that are created by the Constitution among citizens and governments.”43
Structural argument enjoys the advantage that it may sometimes produce
rational and satisfying answers to questions in situations where textual analysis
may suggest preposterous answers. As Charles L. Black, Jr., the dean of
structuralists put it:44
I am inclined to think well of the method of reasoning from structure and
relation. I think well of it, above all, because to succeed it has to make sense current, practical sense. The textual-explication method, operating on general
language, may often - perhaps more often than not - be made to make sense, by
legitimate enough devices of interpretation. But it contains within itself no
guarantee that it will make sense, for a court may always present itself or even
see itself as being bound by the stated intent, however nonsensical, of
somebody else.

The Agnew-Could-Preside argument suffers from the fact that it rests
entirely on a textual argument. To be sure, the text is not a bad place to rest if
the props are sturdy and not easily shaken. When the support does not enjoy
that advantage, textual arguments need reinforcement. Conformity, in
constitutional interpretation and elsewhere, may not be an unmitigated virtue
but occasionally it does have its merits. The fact that judicial and scholarly
discussions generally invoke several types of appeals suggests that many are
pluralistic in their taste in constitutional arguments. The descriptive fact that

41. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
42. See generally David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI.
L. REV. 877 (1996).
43. BOBBITT, supra note 17, at 7.
44. CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 28
(1969).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3297261

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

858

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 44:849

constitutional interpretation in practice generally enlists multiple types of
arguments lends some support to that methodology.45
Considering different types of arguments often helps us better understand
constitutional meaning. Even if clear textual language should be followed,
exploring other modes of argument may help determine what the text means.
What the framers intended the text to mean may shed some light on what it
does mean. So, too, what interested parties and judges have thought the
Constitution means may help us understand what it means today. Similarly,
the structures and relations the text suggests may illuminate a phrase under
consideration. Thus, exploring other types of arguments serves a useful
function. When we are uncertain about what the text means, these other
conventional types of arguments may help us understand. If we feel certain
regarding the text’s meaning, they may furnish a useful check. When all or
most of the other conventional arguments point in the same direction, it may
appropriately fortify our commitment to that conclusion. On the other hand,
when the other modes suggest a different answer, perhaps our first read of the
text should not be our last.46
It is worth consciously considering other types of arguments for another
reason. Interpretation requires not only a text but a reader. When we read a
provision of the Constitution we do so, consciously or not, against a
background of knowledge and understanding. We often know, when we read
the text, how the provision has been interpreted and perhaps what the founders
thought; structural arguments may also inform our understanding. Thus, we
may find the text clear not only because it is clear but also because nothing in
our experience or knowledge clouds our understanding of its language. As an
example, consider the constitutional provisions relating to the Electoral
College.47 We might conclude that the text clearly allows a candidate with
fewer popular votes but more electoral votes to become President not only
because its language so suggests but also because this meaning fits with our
knowledge of the framers’ intent and comports with our nation’s actual
experience.
Resort to arguments in addition to the text also contributes to civic
education. Constitutional argument is one important way in which we seek to
understand the essence of our nation. That discussion becomes far richer and
more productive if not confined to textual exegesis. We are likely to be more
convinced that the Constitution is being expounded correctly when a proffered
interpretation comports with, say, the framers’ intent, ongoing practice, judicial
doctrine, structural ideas, and good sense.
45. On the efficacy of practice based theory, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., How to Choose a
Constitutional Theory, 87 CAL. L. REV. 535 (1999).
46. See generally Fallon, supra note 17.
47. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 3; amend. XII.
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Finally, a pluralistic approach to constitutional decision-making is needed
because the text often is not alone dispositive. Try as we might to find answers
in the text, we sometimes find it mute or garbled with respect to problems we
face. This is not to say that the text has no importance in these instances when
it gives uncertain direction. It remains a touchstone of interpretation, a
necessary starting point which sets some boundaries to channel discussion and
behavior.48
Some clauses of the Constitution confer some general power or status, or
impose some general limit without addressing a specific problem that
eventually arises. On occasion, the difficulty is not so much that the
Constitution speaks to a problem in an ambiguous voice; it is rather that we
cannot be sure that the text really speaks to the specific problem under
discussion. In these instances in particular, textual analysis can mislead, not
reveal. In such cases, the inferences which pieces of text might suggest may
lead us astray. But, the other modes of constitutional argument, which judges
and constitutional lawyers typically employ, may help suggest a resolution.
The textual argument here is not dispositive as its proponents suggest. The
Paulsen et al. thesis is a clever interpretation of textual fragments. But it is not
the only viable reading. The Vice President-Presides thesis clashes with the
conclusions other types of arguments suggest. It is worth considering other
data to interpret the Constitution even for a question as remote from actual
experience as whether Agnew could have presided (had he sought to) at his
impeachment trial (had he not resigned and been impeached).
IV. A CRITIQUE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT-PRESIDES THESIS
To be sure, Professor Paulsen is right when he points out that “[n]owhere
does the Constitution say that the Vice President is stripped of his power as
presiding officer of the Senate just because the business at hand is his own
impeachment trial.”49 Although the text does not say the Vice President cannot
preside, it does not say that he can preside at his own trial either. On the
contrary, the text does not speak specifically to the subject of who presides
when the vice president is tried. It is, in essence, silent. Accordingly, we
cannot determine whether Agnew can preside over his own trial simply by
reading the text; we must invoke other tools of constitutional analysis.
Now Professor Paulsen et al. might contest this point by arguing that since
the text names the Vice President as President of the Senate it is not totally
silent regarding whether the Vice President can preside at his own trial. The
Vice President is entitled to preside unless some specific text withdraws that
power. The President of the Senate clause tilts the scale in favor of the Vice
President; he should benefit from a presumption.
48. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 399, 428-29 (1985).
49. Paulsen, supra note 7, at 245.
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This swing does not quite ring the bell. There are several answers. First,
the President of the Senate Clause may be understood simply as conferring an
office on the Vice President without defining the scope of his duties. In other
words, that clause may simply designate the Vice President as the Senate’s
president without specifying the full scope50 of his authority.51 Under this
approach, Congress, under the Necessary and Proper Clause, or perhaps the
Senate, would retain authority to structure the vice president’s powers.
Alternatively, the President of the Senate Clause is at best a general grant
of power. It tells us generally that the Vice President is President of the Senate
but it does not address whether he can preside over his own inquest. The
President of the Senate Clause might have read:
The Vice President of the United States shall be President of the Senate in
which capacity he shall have the right to preside over its deliberations in all
cases, including when he shall be tried for impeachment subject to the Chief
Justice Clause and the President pro tempore clause.

In that event, the text at least would address the problem. But here the very
generality of the clause might reasonably send us searching for other clues to
provide a more specific authorization before allowing the Vice President to do
something as bizarre as presiding at his own trial.
But the President of the Senate Clause is not the only textual fragment
pertinent to this issue. The President Pro Tempore Clause empowers the
Senate to choose a president pro tempore to preside “in the absence of the vice
president or when he shall exercise the office of president of the United
States.”52 Clearly Agnew was not exercising presidential powers. But if he
was absent during his impeachment trial the Constitution would specifically
authorize the president pro tempore to preside.
Of course, the Vice President presumably would attend his impeachment
trial, and accordingly Professor Paulsen argues he would not be “‘absent’ when
he’s before the Senate for his impeachment trial . . . .”53 Since he is not absent,
the president pro tempore cannot preside. Whether Professor Paulsen is right
depends on from what absence is measured. If “absent” means “not present in
the chamber,” then the Vice President under impeachment would not be absent
if he attends the proceedings. But alternatively absent may refer simply to
absence from the presiding chair. In that case, Vice President Agnew’s
presence in the chamber would not necessarily mean he was entitled to preside.
There might be situations when the Vice President were in the room but
50. The clause does emphasize that the vice president does not vote unless a tie occurs.
51. A similar argument is sometimes made regarding the vesting clause in Article II. See,
e.g., EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 1787-1957 4 (4th ed. 1957)
(asking whether vesting clause constitutes “a mere designation of office”).
52. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 5.
53. Paulsen, supra note 7, at 245.
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necessarily absent from the chair. The Constitution does not, on its face,
resolve this question; it speaks simply of “the absence of the Vice President” as
necessitating a president pro tempore, without specifying absences from what.
This second meaning of absence, measured with reference to his
availability to preside, would seem the more plausible one. Two examples
suggest why. Presumably there are times when the president pro tempore or
his designee presides while the Vice President makes his way to or from the
presiding officer’s chair or stops to chat with a Senator or two. The Vice
President is present in the Senate but no one would argue that the president pro
tempore cannot preside in these situations. It is the Vice President’s absence
from the chair that seems significant. That certainly is the way Senate practice
has interpreted the clause. If the Vice President’s presence in the room does
not disable the president pro tempore from presiding in this instance it should
not do so simply because the Vice President attends his own trial. In either
case, the Vice President is present in the chamber but absent from the chair.
Of course, there is a difference between these two situations. When
Agnew leaves the podium to kibbitz with some lucky senator54 he presumably
is content to allow Eastland or some other member pound the gavel from the
big chair. But when he gets tried on impeachment he wants to make sure the
trial is run right. Accordingly, he is not content to allow Eastland or anyone
else discharge the prerogatives of the chair. In the first case, Agnew’s absence
from the chair is voluntary; in the second, not.
But it is not clear that this distinction should make any difference. First,
on a textual analysis, which is, after all, Professor Paulsen’s approach, the
distinction is irrelevant. The text empowers the president pro tempore to
preside when the Vice President is absent. It may make a difference from what
he must be absent, i.e., the chamber or the chair, but the text is indifferent to
the reason the Vice President is absent or his wishes regarding whether he
presides. In other words, the text does not make the right of the president pro
tempore to preside dependent in any way on whether the Vice President wants
to preside; it is simply a question of absence.
Moreover, the Vice President’s physical presence, in the chamber or chair,
and desire to preside cannot be the sole criteria of her right to preside. Let us
suppose that a Vice President entered the Senate chamber but was physically
or mentally unable to preside. Although she would be present at the Senate’s
place of business, she would be incapable of conducting its business. Surely
the Senate would not be expected to dispense with functioning simply because

54. Agnew once left the chair to lobby Republican Senators to vote for a measure. Senator
Len Jordan of Idaho “chewed him out.” The Republican leadership agreed to the Jordan rule –
whenever Agnew lobbied them, they would vote the opposite way! John Robert Greene, “I’ll
Continue to Speak Out”: Spiro T. Agnew as Vice President, in AT THE PRESIDENT’S SIDE: THE
VICE PRESIDENCY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 127-28 (Timothy Walch ed., 1997).
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a deranged Vice President showed up each day to preside even though too
infirm or irrational to do so. The Constitution would not tolerate such a result,
for it would undermine critical structural principles of government. It would,
for instance, subvert the bicameral nature of the national legislative process.
By disabling the Senate, it would, in effect, prevent Congress from legislating,
or advising and consenting to treaties or appointments. It would convert a
tripartite system into a bipartite system thereby undermining basic principles of
separation of powers and eliminating checks and balances. It could also
undermine the president who could not get advice and consent from a Senate to
appoint executive or judicial officers or enter into treaties.
The requisite “absence” empowers Eastland to preside. But here, since
Agnew wants to preside, his absence from the chair must be compelled. Two
paths take us to this destination. For reasons developed below, I believe the
Constitution precludes the Vice President from presiding at his own trial.
Alternatively, one might conclude that the Constitution does not require
Agnew to preside but does not proscribe it either. In that event, Agnew’s
absence from the chair could be compelled either by a Senate rule or by statute
passed pursuant to the Necessary and Proper Clause. All of this suggests that
the text of the Constitution fails to commit us to the Agnew-gets-to-preside
argument.
Interestingly, the president pro tempore clause identifies two quite
different contingencies when the president pro tempore presides. One,
discussed above, deals with the “absence” of the vice president; the other
addresses situations in which the Vice President “shall exercise the office of
president of the United States.” The first clause is indifferent to why the Vice
President is absent or what he is doing. The point seems to be that just because
the Vice President is absent, the Senate does not grind to a halt. The show, not
to mention the government, must go on. The second clause proceeds from a
totally different impulse. It addresses one particular contingency in which a
surrogate is required. The implication is that a Vice President acting as
President could not preside over the Senate even if not absent.
But is that language necessary to disqualify from presiding over the Senate
a Vice President exercising presidential powers? Suppose the framers left that
clause out. Could a Vice President acting as President then preside over the
Senate? I doubt it. Although the text would not dictate the result, the structure
of the Constitution would. The Constitution creates three separate branches of
government and imposes a system of checks and balances inconsistent with
parliamentary government. Specific clauses reflect that aversion. The
Incompatibility Clause,55 for instance, precludes members of Congress from
assuming executive or judicial offices. It serves as a directive that executive
and legislative personnel must be kept separate. As Akhil Amar put it, “You
55. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2.
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can’t basically be at both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue at once.”56 The
possibility that an Acting President could veto a law and that the Senate (and
House) could override that veto seems inconsistent with the Acting President
presiding. The Acting President should not be able to have two bites at the
apple; he should not intrude on the legislative process by presiding over the
deliberations and then vetoing the measure presented to him.
If this analysis is correct, it suggests that a Vice President acting as
President could not preside over the Senate even had the president pro tempore
clause only included the absence contingency.57 Such a Vice President would
be acting inconsistent with the structure of the Constitution. Thus, if a Vice
President showed up to preside, the Senate might properly tell him to get lost,
since the constitutional principles of separation of powers and checks and
balances compelled his absence. Similarly, a Vice President who attempted to
preside over his impeachment trial might also be told his absence was
constitutionally compelled if, as I will argue below, the Constitution’s structure
mandated his absence.
To be sure, as Professor Paulsen points out, the Constitution specifically
provides that the Chief Justice is to preside at the President’s trial but is silent
56. Akhil Reed Amar, A Few Thoughts on Constitutionalism, Textualism, and Populism, 65
FORDHAM L. REV. 1657, 1660 (1997).
57. There is one embarrassment to this notion that the Constitution separates personnel such
that an Acting President could not preside over the Senate even without the language in the
president pro tempore clause. The Vice Presidency itself seems something of a hybrid. The
original Constitution designated him as President of the Senate with the power to vote in case the
Senate was deadlocked. The early vice president was essentially a legislative officer, although to
some extent put there by default. The Vice Presidency was largely an expedient to facilitate the
original electoral system. Without that duty, founder Hugh Williamson argued, he would be
without employment. His power to break deadlocks gave the presidential runner-up the
occasional power to make the House of Representatives or the President pass on legislative issues
he favored. In the twentieth century the vice president migrated to the executive branch, a change
the Twenty-fifth Amendment confirmed in 1967. See Goldstein, New Constitutional Vice
Presidency, supra note 5, at 530, 544-46.
To be sure, the fact that the Vice President, this executive officer, retains a formal Senate
role cuts against my argument that the president pro tempore clause is not the source of an acting
president’s inability to preside over the Senate. Clearly the Constitution tolerates, to some
degree, an executive official presiding over the Senate. Yet I think the wound is not too deep.
Far from being the President’s man in the Senate, the Vice President originally was the
presidential runner-up and, as such, likely to have been a rival of the Chief Executive. As the
Vice Presidency migrated to the Executive Branch, the Senate role was not repealed, but it has
atrophied and now commands little of his time. His power to break ties simply means the
president wins if the Senate is evenly divided, a circumstance that rarely arises. That outcome
could be achieved as well by simply providing that a Senate tie goes to the President, not the
opposition. Moreover, no one really takes the vice president’s Senate role very seriously (except
perhaps for law professors who write about it). Vice Presidents openly neglect it; yet, to my
knowledge, no one has ever seriously suggested impeaching a Vice President for this dereliction
of duty.
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regarding the Vice President’s. Invoking expressio unius, Professor Paulsen
argues that the textual silence means the Vice President can preside.
Yet this argument credits expressio with more oomph than it has. The
principle of expressio unius is hardly an absolute; it is honored in the breach.
The Constitution provides that it is supreme over contradictory state law but
does not say it trumps federal statutes, but expressio unius has not been
thought to defeat the principle of judicial review of statutes Congress passes.
The Constitution provides that Congress can remove “all civil officers of the
United States” on impeachment and conviction but does not authorize the
President to remove cabinet officers or ambassadors, yet this power is firmly
established. Although expressio is occasionally invoked in constitutional cases
it does not universally command assent. In two recent constitutional cases,
eight of the nine members of the Court have rejected it when it conflicted with
other modes of constitutional argument.58 In many modern applications,
expressio unius appears to be a weak principle of constitutional law, something
of a makeweight. Courts invoke it typically when some other modes of
constitutional argument support it. Thus, the inferences drawn are not
dependent simply on textual silence but rest on other supports.
Finally, expressio unius is inapplicable here because so many alternative,
more plausible theories explain why the Constitution does not specifically
disqualify the Vice President from presiding. That the framers made provisions
for the impeachment trial of the President but not of the Vice President does
not mean they did not intend that the Vice President be disqualified from
presiding over his own trial. They may have thought the principle that no man
would be judge of his own trial so firmly embedded in law as to require no
constitutional restatement. Alternatively, they may have focused on the
presidency because of its importance. The Vice Presidency, which was an
after-thought contrived in the convention’s closing days, attracted less
attention. Congress or the Senate could work out appropriate principles at a
later time.
Surely the text should be taken seriously. But it cannot always be read
literally when so doing leads to silly results that would frustrate its apparent
purposes. The Constitution provides that the Chief Justice will preside over
the President’s impeachment trial. Suppose there was no Chief Justice when
the President was impeached. Would that mean the Senate could not try the
President? Could the President prevent his own removal by refusing to appoint
a Chief Justice when the job fell vacant? Suppose the Chief Justice died or

58. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 969-70 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (rejects
expressio unius argument that conflicts with historical practice; joined by Souter, Ginsburg and
Breyer, JJ.); U.S. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 868, 870 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (rejects expressio
unius argument that conflicts with structural principal of federalism; joined by Rehnquist, C.J.,
and O’Connor and Scalia, JJ.).
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resigned during the trial; would the proceedings grind to an immediate halt?
The text does not provide that anyone else can preside at the President’s
impeachment trial and accordingly expressio unius would suggest the Chief
Justice’s entitlement to be exclusive, but I would feel pretty confident that the
senior justice would discharge that function even though the text specifically
requires the Chief.
V. WHERE OTHER ARGUMENTS LEAD
The textual argument is accordingly hardly persuasive. This frailty is fatal
to the Vice-President-Presides thesis, for the textual argument is its only
support. The notion that Agnew could preside at his own impeachment is not
simply stupid, as Professor Paulsen suggests. We view it as misguided
because it wars with basic structural ideas implicit in the Constitution.
Fundamental structural principles preclude a Vice President from presiding
over his own impeachment trial. First, such a practice would offend ideas
intrinsic to the notion of the rule of law, one of the fundamental concepts of
our Constitution.59 Agnew presiding at his trial would violate the injunction
against being judge in one’s own cause. The principle, which dates to Dr.
Bonham’s case,60 is deeply embedded in our common law tradition and is
central to our jurisprudence. James Madison articulated the aversion to selfjudging in Federalist No. 10, “[n]o man is allowed to be a judge in his own
cause; because his interest would certainly bias his judgment, and, not
improperly, corrupt his integrity,” he wrote.61 Indeed, the Chief Justice Clause
might be understood as articulating this concept. Since the Vice President
would benefit from the President’s removal, he “would be judging his own
cause.”62
Allowing a Vice President to preside would offend another strand of the
rule of law. Marbury v. Madison made clear that the rule of law requires a
remedy for every violation of a right.63 The availability of a remedy presumes
the possibility of a potentially effective one. Yet the problem with self-judging
or self-presiding is that it destroys the efficacy of the remedy. In this respect,
the spectre of a Vice President presiding over his own trial is even more
objectionable than a President pardoning himself.64 Since the pardon
specifically does not extend to impeachment, a President who tried to pardon
himself (putting aside the question of whether he could) would still be subject

59. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., “The Rule of Law” as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse,
97 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1997).
60. 8 Co. Rep. 113b, 118a, 77 Eng. Rep. 638, 652 (C.P. 1610).
61. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 59 (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
62. Amar & Amar, supra note 13, at 122.
63. 5 U.S. at 163.
64. See Kalt, supra note 13.
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to impeachment and removal. But the impeachment remedy could be rendered
ineffective against a Vice President who presided at his own impeachment
trial.
Second, the Constitution reflects an aversion to conflicts of interest in
impeachment proceedings. The Court recognized as much in Nixon v. United
States. Courts could not review decisions in impeachments of judges, the
Court held, because such a power “would place final reviewing authority with
respect to impeachments in the hands of the same body that the impeachment
process is meant to regulate.”65 Indeed, the requirement that the Chief Justice
preside at the President’s impeachment trial seems to reflect this same concern.
It would be unseemly for the vice president to preside at an impeachment
proceeding that might oust the Chief Executive and lead to the vice president’s
promotion. He has a conflict of interest that offends the Constitution. In order
to remove any taint from so important a proceeding, the Chief Justice presides.
But if the Constitution finds it impermissible for the Vice President to preside
over a trial that “could vault him into the oval office,”66 the prospect of the
Vice President presiding at his own trial would seem at least equally suspect.
If the Constitution sees a disabling conflict when presiding unfairly might
facilitate the Vice President’s promotion, it would seem equally offended when
presiding might prevent his demise.
Finally, the Constitution imposes a system of checks and balances to
enforce constitutional limits and produce good and consensus government.
The notion that government officials should be subject to various checks
reflects a commitment to limited government and a belief that enforcement
requires proper arrangement of obstacles and counter weights.
The
Constitution imposes few checks on the Vice President (perhaps because it
gives him little power); one such check is the prospect of impeachment. It
would be anomalous if the Constitution allowed him to preside over his own
trial.67
Not only do these structural arguments cut powerfully, indeed,
compellingly, against the Vice-President-Presides theory. In addition, the
history of the period of the drafting and ratifying the original Constitution
offers reason to believe the farmers would not have intended a Vice President
to preside over his impeachment. In particular, it helps explain some of the
textual fragments in ways that undermine this thesis.
First, the Vice Presidency was an afterthought, first proposed in the closing
days of the Constitutional Convention. In all likelihood, it was conceived as an
expedient to facilitate the presidential elections. The framers feared that
65. Nixon, 506 U.S. at 235.
66. Amar & Amar, supra note 13, at 122.
67. Cf. Nixon, 506 U.S. at 234-35 (structural arguments preclude judicial review of
impeachment, which is significant check on judiciary).
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electors would all support their own states’ favorite son, thereby frustrating
efforts to choose a national, unifying Chief Executive. To control this
temptation, they added a second vote with the proviso that electors could not
cast both votes for home state candidates. To induce electors to take seriously
the second vote, they added a second office. The framers directed little
attention to the Vice Presidency, regarding it as a device to facilitate the
election of a national president.68
Moreover, the framers gave little thought to the impeachment of a Vice
President. They were preoccupied with impeachment of the President,
debating the topic at length on July 20, 178769 and returning to the subject
repeatedly during the next several weeks.70 It was not until September 4, 1787,
that the Committee of Eleven recommended that the Vice Presidency be
created. It also recommended empowering the Senate to try impeachments.
The Vice President would be ex officio President of the Senate but would not
preside when the President was tried. Four days later the Convention
discussed the impeachment provisions regarding the President in some detail.
Near the end of the debate, the Convention, for the first time, extended the
impeachment remedy to the Vice President and the civil officers of the United
States.71 A committee on style was appointed to clean up the prose and
organization but without authority to fiddle with substance. It reported a draft
on September 12 which, with little modification, became the proposed
Constitution five days later.72
These historical circumstances may help explain the framers failure to
specify that the Vice President could not preside at his own trial. The
historical data suggests an alternative, more plausible explanation than
Professor Paulsen’s conclusion that “the omission [of language precluding the
vice president from presiding at his own trial] can scarcely have been
accidental, for the impeachment clause specifically provides that the Chief
Justice, not the Vice President, presides when the President of the United
States is impeached.”73 Professor Paulsen’s conclusion would make sense only
if some parity existed between the treatment of the Presidency and Vice
Presidency at the Constitutional Convention. There was none. The framers
labored over the presidency, debating it exhaustively. The Vice Presidency
received little attention; impeachment of a Vice President even less. The
Convention had substituted the Chief Justice for the Vice President to preside
over a presidential impeachment trial several days before it even extended
68. See Goldstein, New Constitutional Vice Presidency, supra note 5, at 512-13.
69. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 64-69 (Max Farrand ed., 1966).
70. See John D. Feerick, Impeaching Federal Judges: A Study of the Constitutional
Provisions, 39 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 19-21 (1970).
71. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 69, at 552.
72. See Feerick, supra note 70, at 23.
73. Paulsen, supra note 7, at 246.
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impeachment to the Vice Presidency. It is hardly surprising that under the
circumstances the framers did not focus on the issue Professor Paulsen et al.
raised two centuries later. They were, no doubt, tired and hot and homesick,
and eager to adjourn. If they had radar screens, the question of who would
preside at a vice-presidential impeachment would not have been anywhere on
them. It was a detail that slipped through the cracks in the closing days of the
founders’ deliberations.
To the extent Professor Paulsen believes that the “omission of any such
exception [to the Vice President presiding over his impeachment] can scarcely
have been accidental,”74 he is, I believe, mistaken. It is inconceivable to
imagine James Madison and the other founders consciously considering with
equanimity the prospect of an impeached Vice President presiding over his
own trial and concluding that it was good, especially given Madison’s
opposition to self-judging. Its omission does not reflect a conscious intent to
distinguish between the situation of the President and the Vice President. Had
they thought of it, the framers surely would have provided that either the
president pro tempore or the Chief Justice would preside over the Vice
President’s impeachment trial.
Or perhaps they thought they had, in fact, specifically so provided, at least
for most occasions. The framers conceived the Vice President as a legislative
officer. As such, it was unlikely that occasion would arise to remove him by
impeachment and conviction. The time when the Vice President would be at
risk would be on those occasions when he exercised the office of the President.
The weight of the evidence suggests that the framers did not intend the Vice
President become President upon the death, resignation, removal or inability of
his predecessor; they intended him only to exercise the powers and duties of
the office.75 Thus, the framers conceived that when the Vice President acted as
President, and accordingly would be most vulnerable, he could not preside
over the Senate! It would be odd to conclude that the framers intended the
Chief Justice to preside when the President was tried for impeachment but not
if the Vice President acting as president was. More likely, the framers’ intent
was that the President pro tempore preside whenever the Vice President acted

74. Id.
75. See, e.g., JOHN D. FEERICK, FROM FAILING HANDS: THE STORY OF PRESIDENTIAL
SUCCESSION 39-56 (1965); Goldstein, New Constitutional Vice Presidency, supra note 5, at 51618; Amar & Amar, supra note 13, at 118.
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as President but that the Chief Justice76 would preside over the impeachment
trial of the President or Vice President acting as President.77
The Vice President has evolved into an officer of the Executive Branch.
He rarely presides over the Senate, except on ceremonial occasions or to break
ties in favor of the Administration. In view of this ongoing history, it would be
anomalous if he sought to preside over a substantive event as momentous as
his own trial!
VI. CONCLUSION
The Vice President-Presides thesis illustrates the fallacy of textualism
pushed to extremes. To the extent the text supports that theory, it does so
inferentially, not explicitly, and only if the reader accepts three questionable
propositions: a) the President of the Senate Clause means the Vice President
can always preside unless the Constitution, in explicit language, precludes him
from doing so; b) absence, in the President Pro Tempore Clause, is absence
from the chamber, not the presiding chair; and c) expressio unius can support a
totally anomalous result when invoked with no other support. Even if the
interpreter makes these moves, she has still not established the thesis. For the
interpreter must also accept the proposition that the textual argument is
sufficiently strong to ignore the structural arguments that explode it and the
historical data that tends to impeach it.
“[W]e must never forget that it is a Constitution we are expounding,” Chief
Justice Marshall reminded us.78 If it is to endure for the ages, as he told us was
the idea, it must continue to command the respect and assent of the people.
That it will not do if it is construed in ways that violate basic structural

76. Since the Presidential Succession Act of 1792 placed the Senate President pro tempore
after the Vice President in the line of succession, an additional reason then existed to prefer the
case of Justices as presiding officers over a vice-presidential trial. The present law places the
Speaker of the House ahead of the President pro tempore of the Senate. The ability of the
President to fill a vice-presidential vacancy with approval of the House and Senate, see U.S.
CONST. amend. XXV, § 2, minimizes the possible conflict of a president pro tempore presiding.
Thus, I think Dean Feerick’s suggestion that the president pro tempore will preside is very
reasonable, and especially compelling when the vice president is not the Acting President.
77. To be sure, this history does not specifically address Agnew’s situation. In our
hypothetical, he was not impeached for offenses committed while acting as President but (in part)
as Vice President. Yet, the facts may be closer than suggested above. Under the framers’ design,
when the Vice President exercised the Presidency he became an executive officer who could not
preside over the Senate. If then impeached, he specifically could not preside over his
impeachment. This reinforces the idea that whenever the Vice President is impeached as an
executive officer, he cannot preside over the proceedings. This reading brings the theory close to
Agnew’s situation. For Agnew, in the hypothetical, was impeached for actions taken in part as
Vice President. Of course, for other reasons he cannot preside, regardless of the basis of his
impeachment.
78. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 407 (1819).
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commitments and accordingly produce results that are fundamentally dubious.
To be sure, real constitutional stupidities may exist which the text makes so
compelling that an interpreter cannot escape. When that occurs, we can expect
to see the text reinforced by other modes of constitutional argument—the
framers’ intent, ongoing history, judicial doctrine, structural concepts,
pragmatism. But, there is no need to accept without challenge a conclusion as
problematic as the Vice President-Presides thesis which rests on a naked, and
not very convincing, textualism at odds with all other constitutional arguments.
The Constitution would not support an effort of a Vice President to preside
over his own impeachment.
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